The stories of three challengers who defeated sitting members of Congress for their parties' nominations
The three incumbents - U.S. Reps. Merrill Cook (R-Utah), Matthew Martinez (D-Calif.) and Michael Forbes (D-N.Y.) - were ousted for different reasons, but all of their primary outcomes did have one thing in common: a perceived lack of accountability to the voters in their districts.
HOW INSURMOUNTABLE is incumbency? In recent years, only a tiny percentage of sitting members of Congress have been defeated in primaries. Without the reninforcing national party wave that is occasionally present in general elections, beating incumbents for renomination is a difficult task. But it can be done. In 2000, three members of Congress lost their party nomination contests and were forced to serve extended lame-duck terms.
The three - U.S. Reps. Merrill Cook (R-Utah), Matthew Martinez (D-Calif.) and Michael Forbes (D-N.Y.) - were ousted for different reasons, but all of their primary outcomes did have one thing in common: a perceived lack of accountability to the voters in their districts. That, combined with smart campaigning on the part of their intra-party rivals, was a losing combination for all three incumbents.
Here's how their opponents did it.
Utah 2: Smith vs. Cook
JUST BEFORE the 1998 elections, residents of Utah's 2nd Congressional District, centered in Salt Lake City, were starting to gossip about Republican U.S. Rep. Merrill Cook. Cook had been in and out of Republican politics for many years, but never had he attracted as much attention as he did then - when he threw a tantrum in state party headquarters.
Distraught that he had been left offa GOTV message encouraging voters to support other Republican candidates, he exploded at Sen. Bill Bennett and the current GOP party chair, Spencer Stokes.
He was reportedly banned from party headquarters, which got the rumor mill churning: Was Cook unstable? Were his angry outbursts manifestations of his "losing it"? Repeated staff firings and rehirings only exacerbated the talk, and local Republicans started to eye primary challenges to the second-term incumbent. Cook dismissed the talk and blamed the media. Local GOP pois weren't so sure. Democrats, of course, were ecstatic.
Cook had never been good at keeping political friends; he made enemies when he left the Republican party to run as an Independent for governor in 1988. He had a falling out with the state GOP over then-Gov. Norm Bangerter's proposal to increase taxes, and he captured 21 percent of the vote as a third-party candidate. He ran as an Independent for governor again in 1992, capturing 34 percent, and for the 2nd District House seat in 1994, capturing 18 percent. He also made unsuccessful runs for the local school board, mayor of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County Commissioner.
Encouraged by the GOP victory wave in 1994, he realigned with the party. In 1996, he ran to replace Republican freshman Enid Greene, who decided not to run for re-election after a scandal involving her husband's mishandling of her campaign finances. Cook won the 1996 general election with 55 percent of the vote, outspending Democrat Ross Anderson 2-to-1.
The 2nd is the most liberal district in a solidly conservative, Republican state. Democrats held the seat from 1986-95, and Cook was a Democratic Party target when he ran for re-election in 1998. Lily Eskelsen, a teacher, was thought to be a strong competitor against Cook, spending 1677,000 to Cook's $647,000. But in the end, the freshman incumbent prevailed, beating Eskelsen 53-43 percent.
Although Cook had kicked up his share of controversy within the party establishment, he had a small cadre of loyal grassroots supporters who had switched parties with him more than once - fueling his many runs with a measure of limited public support. However, by early 2000, many old supporters were abandoning him. He had been pummeled by the press, who found stories of his angry outbursts and constant staff turnover disturbing. A former staffer who had at one point publicly threatened to expose Cook for alleged inappropriate comments was rehired to his staff, prompting news stories about her role in the office. Utah-based political consultant R.T Nielson sued Cook for unpaid bills from the 1998 campaign and eventually won a $170,000 claim. Old stories of strange auto incidents - and alleged outlandish acts of road rage - were also brought up.
Key operatives in the state Republican Party, with whom Cook had no love lost, began to talk openly about possible intra-party challenges. Almost a year before the party's June 2000 nominating convention, party insiders expected a serious primary challenge.
As 1999 wore on, several Salt Lake City Republicans considered running. Mark Emerson - a staffer for 3rd District Republican U.S. Rep. Christopher B. Cannon, a colleague but no ally of Cook - appeared the most likely to run. He bowed out, however, after Jeff Wright, a big Republican donor, jumped in.
Utah's primary process is different from that in most states. Congressional nominees are selected in party conventions, unless no candidate gets more than 60 percent of the vote there. In that case, the nomination is settled by a popular vote in an election.
Wright, a 28-year-old venture capitalist and millionaire, met with hundreds of delegates and touted his insider support. But minutes before the filing deadline, a surprise candidate emerged - Derek Smith, also a millionaire.
Smith spent the next few weeks talking with party insiders and spending money on statewide ads - though only a few hundred convention delegates would actually be voting.
When the May 6 convention arrived, most people believed Wright would force Cook into a primary. A last-minute endorsement, however, tipped the scales. Cannon endorsed Smith, saying he didn't think his colleague Cook would be elected "in this environment."
In the first round of voting, Wright received 23 percent of the delegates and was eliminated. A second round of voting gave Smith 46 percent against incumbent Cook, forcing the two into a June 27 primary. Cook received 54 percent of the delegates, 6 points shy of the required 60 percent needed needed for a convention nomination.
As Republicans drew blood, Democrats quietly waited in the wings with their stellar recruit, energy consultant Jim Matheson. Matheson, the son of the state's popular former Democratic governor, Scott Matheson (1977-'85), had consistently done well in polls. Boosted by his venerable family name, moderate stands on issues and Cook's negatives, Matheson was the general election frontrunner from the start.
As the GOP primary fight began, incumbent Cook lagged behind Smith in the polls by double-digit margins. Both trailed Democrat Matheson in general election polls.
It didn't take long for the primary to become a dogfight. Smith, whose campaign was almost entirely run by former Cook staffers and aides to Cannon, immediately took hard hits from Cook, who went after his opponent with bareknuckled exuberance. Cook's campaign accused Smith of financial misdealings, floating speculation that Smith sold stock at inflated prices to finance his campaign and get around federal contribution limits. He also attacked Smith for ducking debates, though the two eventually met more than 10 times before the primary.
Smith didn't take the attacks lying down. His spokeswoman, Laurie Maddox, slammed the embattled GOP incumbent at every turn: "He lies without blinking," she said at one point. "He makes things up, he spews complete bull. It's particularly awful this year because he is so vulnerable."
The contentiousness came to a head just before the primary, when the two candidates met in the street and engaged in a half-hour verbal slugfest.
Nine Questions
The formal back-and-forth began with a fax from the Cook campaign to the Smith campaign that included a list of nine questions for Smith and a deadline of Thursday at 2 p.m. Many of the questions involved Smith's financial dealings and how he had funded his campaign. Cook later held a press conference at which he publicized his list.
In response, Smith and his entire staff held a press conference on the steps of Cook's campaign headquarters. Smith answered as many of the questions as he said he could, with exceptions for those that he said breached private business confidentiality agreements. He then presented his opponent's campaign - Cook was not at the headquarters when Smith arrived - with a list of questions about Cook's background. Smith then found Cook, who was speaking to reporters nearby, and accused him of falsely attacking him in a recent radio ad. What followed was a 30-minute argument in front of scores of reporters that ended up on the evening news and in the morning papers. The Salt Lake Tribune called it "verbally mud-soaked to the skin" and "more like a schoolyard dust-up than a debate."
As the fighting ensued, Smith's campaign released positive television ads and direct mail. With David Weeks of David Weeks & Co. doing media and Peter Valcarce of Arena Communications doing mail, the campaign attempted to turn the race on a positive note.
"The whole notion of our mailings was to paint a picture of Smith as someone positive for the district," said Valcarce.
But press coverage of dueling faxes and angry shouting matches made that hard to do. As the two candidates continued to trade barbs, it was the raging conflict that grabbed the most attention.
Meanwhile, Cook attempted to show differences between the two candidates, criticizing Smith's tax plan and education ideas. In reality, however, they were both conservatives whose values were in line with most Republicans in the 2nd District.
Cook also briefly attempted a mea culpa strategy of owning up to his "quirkiness" and professing that issues were the most important factor in voting, not personality - a strategy Valcarce now says was the "best message he could have had."
But Cook did not doggedly pursue the message, and rumors swirled around Cook's personal conduct to the point that they gained a weight of credibility based on word-of-mouth allegations. In the end, he was never able to effectively dispute them.
Personality continued to be a factor in the minds of many voters. Primary day was Cook's last stand: He lost renomination by a wide margin, 41-59 percent.
Bloodsport Splashing
Smith won a decisive battle: rarely do challengers defeat incumbent members of Congress in primaries.
But winning the battle had been a costly effort, not just in resources spent but in blood lost. For Smith, winning the war - in this case, the Nov. 7 general election - would prove a lot tougher. The tone of the primary would be his ultimate undoing.
Democratic nominee Jim Matheson ran mostly positive ads that worked to reinforce his image as the moderate, stable son of one of the state's best regarded former governors.
"It was a very organized campaign," said Karl Struble, Matheson's media consultant. "Jim was consistent to what people already thought a Matheson was - even though a lot of people didn't even know what a Matheson was when the campaign began. We activated that feeling in the campaign."
Smith, along with state and federal party committees, aired ads meant to solidify his Republican base, warning of the dangers of a Democratic Congress. One ad asked, "Will the Boy Scouts be forced to accept homosexual leaders? Will we fight to stop abortion?"
In response to the Smith ads, the Matheson's campaign aired an ad saying he wasn't raised to play politics this way, begruding the attacks and taking the high road.
Struble says Smith missed an opportunity to project a positive image. "They got too personal and nasty in the primary," he said. "Smith could have played the good guy and won that election. ...But when Smith started acting like Cook Jr., we didn't have to worry. Smith's problems played right into our hands... If a tree is going to fall, get out of its way."
On Nov. 7, Matheson's nice-guy campaign defeated Smith's more aggressive effort, 56-41 percent. Matheson proved a lesson, at least in the general election, that runs contrary to the conventional wisdom about the efficacy of negative campaigning. As consultant Struble put it, "Winning politics doesn't have to be a blood sport."
New York 1: Seltzer vs. Forbes
NEW YORK state Republicans were stunned when 1st District U.S. Rep. Mike Forbes decided to switch to the Democratic Party. Forbes had always been a bit of a showhorse, but his July 1999 conversion was seen by many angry Republicans as an obvious display of political opportunism.
Forbes made the announcement in grand style, saying that the House Republican leadership was "extremist." The three-term incumbent said the party "has become an angry, narrow-minded, intolerant and uncaring majority, incapable of governing at all, much less from the center, and tone-deaf to the concerns of a vast majority of Americans."
Twelve members of Forbes' staff- who learned of the switch not from their boss but from the media - immediately resigned and said they would work to defeat him the following year. Local Republican loyalists were understandably furious; they had worked hard to re-elect Forbes in 1998 against Democrat William Hoist. National Republican strategists were also upset - they now had one less House seat with an incumbent advantage going in the 2000 elections, when they would fight Democrats in a titanic national struggle for control of Congress.
GOP colleagues also were puzzled because Forbes was not necessarily seen as a left-leaning moderate. His switch would have been understandable if he had voted with Democrats more often, but he had generally charted a mainstream conservative course, with a few notable exceptions, over his five-year House tenure.
Forbes had broken with the Republican congressional leadership on campaign finance reform and regulation of the managed health care industry. In 1996, he strayed off the reservation when he expressed his view that controversial GOP speaker Newt Gingrich was too bruised by ethics investigations to carry out his party's legislative agenda.
However, Forbes had been a supporter of Gingrich before the speaker's ethics problems and falling poll ratings began to take their toll, and he voted for articles of impeachment against Bill Clinton. He stood with conservatives on the issue of abortion, joining demonstrators on the 25th anniversary of Roe vs. Wade. He was also a strong supporter of school vouchers, a stand rejected by teachers' unions and many Democrats in Congress. Two months before he left the GOP, Majority Whip Tom DeLay signed a letter for a $l,000-a-head fundraiser for Forbes.
Unfortunately for Forbes, the Long Island district - where party chairmen are called "bosses" - has definite conservative leanings, though voters tend to hold more liberal views on many social issues. Clinton barely won the district in 1996, but Republicans have usually dominated local elections.
Forbes had done relatively well in his past three elections. He won the 1994 Republican primary with 55 percent of the vote against two opponents, who received 33 percent and 1 1 percent, respectively. In the general election that year, he beat Democrat George Hochbrueckner, who outspent him $719,102 to $265,930, by 53-47 percent. In 1996, he won re-election by defeating Democrat Nora Bredes 55-45 percent. In 1998, he won again with 64 percent against Democrat William Hoist. Forbes had outspent Bredes by more than 2-to-l and Hoist by more than 17-to-1.
But it wasn't to be in 2000. A year after the switch, the chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee, U.S. Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA), would refer to Forbes' chances of re-election as a Democrat by saying, "Have you ever heard of the movie 'Dead Man Walking?'"
Though Forbes was increasingly viewed as an oddball by some local Democrats who had fought him in the past, Democratic Party officials in Washington saw the district as one more building block in their effort to construct a new House majority. They would protect their newest convert with everything they had and would funnel a large amount of money into the race.
The 1st District, which reaches out to the eastern tip of Long Island, is a mix of posh resort towns and working-class enclaves. Suburban places like Brookhaven tend to be more conservative, while many wealthy areas are more liberal, reflecting the social liberalism of nearby Manhattan. Republicans have a 2-to-l registration advantage, however.
Forbes attempted to navigate these ideological differences by promoting some liberal views - such as environmental reform and increased funding for breast cancer research - while working for tax cuts and opposing abortion rights. He also kept up a good relationship with organized labor in the district, whose support would be crucial to his reelection.
Republicans thought Forbes to be vulnerable despite his new Democratic allies, but they knew they would have to run the right candidate against him. They settled on Brookhaven town supervisor Felix Grucci, a fairly moderate Republican who owned a successful fireworks business.
The party quickly rallied around Grucci after he entered the race in March 2000. He immediately began to contrast himself from the incumbent, saying in his announcement speech that "Mike Forbes abandoned the shared values and principles the voters elected him to bring to our nation's capital... He turned his back on our Long Island values, choosing instead to embrace the values of Hillary Clinton and Al Gore."
Trying to consolidate a new center-left base of Democrats, Independents and moderate Republicans, Forbes struggled with what those "Long Island values" meant in hard political terms. When the Right To Life Party - a strong force in New York's multiparty political system, where many high-profile Republicans like Gov. George Pataki and New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani are pro-choice - handed its endorsement to him, both incumbent and party found themselves in a hard place.
The Right To Life Party had strongly supported Forbes when he ran for Congress as a Republican. But Democratic strategists were worried that the endorsement would alienate his new party's members and urged him not to accept it. "He might gain 8,000 Right To Life votes, but he'll lose 30,000 Democrats in the process," said Brookhaven Democratic Chairman Kevin Mitchell at the time.
But instead of quietly refusing the endorsement, Forbes decided to run a full-page ad in a weekly newspaper blasting Right To Life party leaders, whom he said had "sold out their grassroots" for money and higher offices.
Sensing that Forbes was floundering, several prominent local Democrats looked at challenging him in the primary. But district party leaders decided that Democrats would be stronger if they had a united front, and they discouraged challengers. Tony Bullock, chief of staff to former Democratic Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, briefly considered a challenge but decided not to run when most party officials gave the incumbent their backing.
But much of the Democratic support for Forbes seemed half-hearted. Instead of promoting his personal qualities or touting his stands on issues, they put their support in tactical terms and spoke about the partisan balance in the House. When Judith Hope, head of the state Democratic party, endorsed Forbes, she said she was doing so because she had been "largely persuaded by the recognition that Mike Forbes is one more vote for Dick Gephardt to be speaker, and we're obviously close to achieving that."
In June, just three months before the September primary, a 71 -year-old librarian decided to jump into the Democratic primary against Forbes. Regina Seltzer, a retired Brookhaven town councilwoman, was angry that no one would enter the race, so she decided to run. Recently widowed and not politically ambitious, she entered after it became clear that no one else would challenge the incumbent for nomination as the candidate of his new party.
Seltzer remained off of most political radar screens, with most attention focused on the onslaught of anti-Forbes ads and direct mail pieces that were financed by Republicans. The Republican Majority Issues Committee (RMIC), a so-called "527" group associated with Republican DeLay, was targeting Forbes with an organized effort, and pictures from the incumbent's past were suddenly popping up all over town.
The RMIC received a lot of press when it decided to advertise on television screens at checkout counters in local 7-Eleven stores, showing a picture of Forbes with former Speaker Gingrich and asking "Who stood with Newt Gingrich 100 percent?" The ads then asked voters to "call Congressman Forbes and tell him you are proud he stood by Newt Gingrich in his first year."
Karl Gallant, chairman of RMIC, says the television screens were particularly effective in that district because of the commuter atmosphere there. "It's Long Island and people are whipping on and off of expressways and in and out of 7-Elevens."
In response, local Democrats aired radio ads attacking Grucci and his "special interest friends." Instead of focusing on the primary, local Democrats who wanted to hold the seat were already running a general election campaign.
Forbes led Grucci by 12 points in a June poll done by his pollster, Greenberg Quinlan Research. But Forbes' general election poll lead didn't tell the whole story. Sure, he had a large war chest and the advantage of incumbency, but his ground operation was struggling. There was little evidence of grassroots enthusiasm on his behalf. As Newsday columnist Mark Grossman would say after the primary, "No one could ever identify 'Forbes people.'"
Just before the September 12 primary, Seltzer sat down in her living room with a group of volunteers and sent a mailing to 5,000 fellow Democrats. At the same time, the RMIC was sending out direct mail detailing some of Forbes' more conservative votes, all designed to destroy his credibility among Democratic and Republican voters.
The Republican mail campaign was working, according to Gallant. RMIC had put its name as well as a reply address - not including postage - on the bottom of the mailing. "I knew we were successful when hundreds of replies came back, many thanking us for what we had done," he said.
Gallant says the RMIC campaign worked so well because the Democratic base was already unhappy, and Republican efforts only played into voters' discontent with the national agenda affecting local campaigns. In addition, RMIC had local people, not national people, working for them. "You don't run national campaigns in local congressional races," he said.
However, RMICs agenda was clearly a national one. Because Forbes had switched parties with the urging of national Democrats, Republicans saw his defeat as the "holy grail" of the 2000 battle for the U.S. House. "We wanted to change the psychology of the entire election," said Gallant.
The day of the primary, Seltzer volunteers made personalized GOTV phone calls. The Forbes campaign sent out a recorded message to supporters, with a message from Democratic Minority Leader Dick Gephardt.
At the end of the day, Seltzer stunned political observers, national and local. She won the low-turnout primary with 6,077 votes - a mere 35 more than Forbes received. As ballots were counted and recounted, Forbes issued a statement saying, "Clearly, I am a realistic fellow. When you end an election night with a deficit of votes, the odds of'making those votes up are a long shot."
Seltzer had spent $24,000 on her underdog, insurgent campaign; Forbes, the incumbent with big-shot party support, spent $800,000. In terms of money and incumbency advantage, it was no match. But money and incumbency advantage were not the only factors in this primary.
An editorial in the next day's Newsday asked readers to "chalk one up for the people. The defeat of U.S. Rep. Michael Forbes... is not only a stunning upset by itself, but a rebuke to the power brokers in Washington who believed they could dictate to the people of the 1st Congressional District."
The editorial recognized what the voters were saying: the party's Washington-based cognoscenti had persuaded Forbes to switch parties to gain one more critical seat, donating loads of money to his campaign and doing their best to brush away internal opposition. But one thing they forgot to do may have mattered most in the end: They didn't check with local Democrats. And apparently, neither did Michael Forbes.
In the general election, longshot Seltzer lost to Grucci, 56-41 percent.
California 31: Solis vs. Martinez
AS THE POLITICAL calendar rolled into 2000, California Democratic U.S. Rep. Matthew Martinez seemed to be ambling along, as he always had, to another re-election. The most senior Hispanic member of the House had remained relatively low-key in his heavily-Democratic eastern Los Angeles district since his election in 1 984.
Martinez had relied on solid union support to win his elections, though he had been criticized over his 18 years in Congress for staying away from the district too often and for his weak stand on big issues such as gun control. He was occasionally challenged in primaries - once by the wife of his predecessor, George E. Danielson.
He won re-election in 1996 and 1998 without Democratic opposition, however, and defeated his general election challengers with 70 percent and 67 percent, respectively. But in 1994, he faced three Democrats and won with 55 percent. The second-place finisher ran well behind, capturing 23 percent. That year, he won the general election with 59 percent. The 1992 primary produced a similar outcome. Martinez won it with 57 percent and the second place finisher polled 25 percent; he won the general election with 63 percent.
In 2000, the local AFL-CIO - led by Miguel Contreras, who has been called "the new General Patton" of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor - saw opportunity in Martinez's shortcomings. Though the congressman was a reliable labor vote, Contreras and other union leaders believed he was not passionate enough in denouncing free trade policies.
Martinez also offended some liberals in his district with his National Rifle Association membership and his support of a ban on partial birth abortion.
In addition, Martinez had been known for weak constituent contact. He defended his absence from the district by asking, "How can you be present when you're busy working 3,000 miles away?"
Many Los Angeles Democrats, dissatisfied with Martinez's out-of-sight-out-of-mind profile and his inconsistent commitment to progressive principles, had often wanted to defeat him for renomination, but they were never able to muster the right candidate, or campaign, to topple him. They believed him to be vulnerable in 2000, but initial polling showed that there were few serious negatives to exploit.
A running feud between Martinez and a Democratic state senator named Hilda Solis was the subject of party gossip, and talk of a Solis challenge to the congressman began in early 1999. Former California Assemblywoman Diane Martinez, the incumbent congressman's daughter, had at one point threatened to challenge Solis in a state senate primary. She abandoned the bid, however, when she decided on an ultimately unsuccessful run against Republican state Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush.
Solis, who would have been prevented from seeking re-election to the state Senate in 2002 because of term limits, declared her candidacy in the primary against Martinez in June 1999. She started her congressional campaign with $1 1,000 but had $184,000 on hand by the end ofthat year. In contrast, Martinez entered election year with only $100,000 in cash.
Usually, when incumbents find themselves seriously threatened in primaries, rare as it is, it is after a peculiar controversy has weakened their credibility - Michael Forbes' party switch, Merrill Cook's outbursts and California U.S. Rep. Jay Kim's indictment and bizarre house arrest in 1998 - but this campaign was different. Martinez started out the race with net positive job ratings from his constituents and throughout the primary received relatively little negative press. Not one TV ad was aired throughout the entire primary race, by either candidate, and there was little traditional mudslinging.
But Martinez was somewhat out of touch as a candidate, and Solis understood the dynamics of modern campaigning. Early on, she organized ground troops and signed on experienced consultants, pollster Diane Feldman and general consultant Parke Skelton of SG&A Campaigns. She began to lobby for important endorsements - most importantly labor.
Labor's Movement
Before her congressional race, Solis already had strong appeal within the labor movement. Her support of the successful 1996 initiative that raised the state's minimum wage to $5.75 an hour was much appreciated by union activists. Though Martinez had a near-perfect "career grade" from the AFL-CIO of 95 percent, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor turned its back on him and decided on Solis. Contreras, who leads the local federation, said they needed representatives who not only voted the right way, but who were "warriors in Washington." It was a key defection that robbed Martinez of a once-reliable support base.
Martinez still had some union support, with backing by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. He rebuked labor's support of Solis with an arrogance that became commonplace throughout the primary, telling the Los Angeles Times, "They don't mean a damn thing. When I first ran [for state Assembly] in 1980, every single union endorsed the incumbent and I still won." It was a comment that energized his former allies against him.
Labor wasn't the only defection Martinez suffered. He also lost the important backing of Democratic U.S. Reps. Henry Waxman and Howard Berman, leaders of a political "machine" in the Los Angeles area that has been for years a key source of money and organizational assistance for annointed candidates.
Berman and Waxman had helped Martinez in the past, and their decision to remain neutral signaled that 2000 was a new ballgame for the 31st District incumbent. Without these valuable hands in his campaign, Martinez was left with a weak personal organization.
As Martinez scrambled to stem the tide running against him, Solis stayed on message. She sent out repeated direct mail pieces detailing the incumbent's record in Congress and his votes in support of the National Rifle Association. The television market in Los Angeles was too expensive for her campaign to consider buying ads, so she focused on a ground effort with heavy direct mail, telephone and door-to-door components.
To help raise funds, Solis had the backing of EMILY's List, the national PAC that supports prochoice Democratic women candidates with a shot at winning. With the group's help, she raised more than $550,000 by the March 7 primary. Martinez had raised about $150,000.
Solis's mail messages were direct and to the point. Skelton, who put together the mail campaign for Solis, said that Martinez "had a long record of not doing much. When people had the opportunity to compare the two candidates side to side, they realized who would be better. You don't have to savage the incumbent just to make people realize who would be a better alternative."
Martinez did not send out nearly as much mail as his challenger, but he did respond to Solis's mail onslaught with a piece that emphasized his seniority in Washington, boasting of his clout as the most senior Hispanic member of the U.S. House. To make his point, he even mentioned that he had a better parking space than most of his colleagues.
"That is about the most insider thing you can do," said Skelton. "You have to earn that support every two years. A lot of members of Congress forget how to run... Voters will change members of Congress like they change shoes if they think it makes the outfit look better."
As the campaign continued on, Solis garnered several additional endorsements that were embarrassing to Martinez - one of which was that of Martinez's own sister, Helen Lujan, a local school board member. "We see Hilda and we don't see Matthew," she said. It was a devastating hit.
Democratic U.S. Rep. Loretta Sanchez, who represents a nearby southern Califor- nia district, also endorsed the challenger, saying that Solis had given her a valuable endorsement in her contentious 1996 campaign to unseat then-U.S. Rep. Bob Dornan. Martinez responded by calling Sanchez a "freaking idiot."
The final blow was the endorsement of Solis by state and local Democratic party committees and their intense get-out-the-vote drives on her behalf. Democratic leaders said that the primary defeat of the Democratic incumbent would not hurt the party because Martinez did not have enough of a presence in the district to cause any aftershocks in the political community. In such a solidly Democratic district, they assured loyalists, there was no chance that the party would lose the seat regardless of the primary's outcome - so they urged Democrats to vote for the best Democrat available, not just the one already in the job.
When the "Super Tuesday" primary arrived in California, the voter's choice in the 31st District Democratic primary for Congress was resounding. Martinez, the district's congressman for 18 years, garnered a paltry 29 percent of the vote. Solis captured an impressive 62 percent, winning nomination in an unexpected landslide. Shortly thereafter, Martinez switched to the Republican Party in retaliation against the many Democrats who had deserted his re-election.
Reflecting on the results, Skelton had the following advice for challengers running against frontrunning incumbents: "We started 12 points behind in our own benchmark survey. You have to look beyond the initial head-to-head polling numbers and the conventional wisdom that you can't possibly win."
In November, Solis won the general election with 79 percent.
[Sidebar]
The Toteboard: Handlers, Wagers & Payoffs
UTAH 2
Smith:
Manager: Todd Thorpe
Media: David Weeks & Co.
Pollster: Public Opinion Strategies
Mail: Arena Communications
Expenditures: $1,673,748 (total); $649,739 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 37,494 (59%)
Votes: general - 107,114 (41%)
Cook:
Manager Camille Cook
Media: Richard Snelgrove
Mail: Pinnacle Direct, Jane Nelson
Expenditures: $418,671 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 26,199 (41%)
Matheson:
Managen Megan Sather
Media: Struble Oppel Eichenbaum Communications
Pollster: Bennett, Petts and Blumenthal
Mail: Terris, Jaye & Barnes
Expenditures: $1,301,290 (total)
Votes: general - 145,021 (56%)
NEW YORK 1
Forbes:
Managen Jeff Stein
Media: Main Street Communications (no ads aired)
Pollster: Greenberg Quinlan
Mail: Crounse Malchow & Schlackman
Expenditures: $1,260,340 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 6,042 (49.9%)
Seltzer:
Manager: Terry Pearsall
Expenditures: $338,169 (total), $48,675 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 6,077 (50.1%)
Votes: general - 97,299 (41%)
Grucci:
Managen Aris McMahon, Howard DiMartini
Media: Welch, St. Claire & Assoc.
Pollster: Fabrizio McLaughlin
Mail: Welch, St. Claire & Assoc.
Expenditures: $1,541,903 (total)
Votes: general - 1 33,020 (56%)
CALIFORNIA 31
Soils:
Manager: Cynthia Corona
Pollster: The Feldman Group
Mail: SG&A Campaigns
Expenditures: $700,498 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 48,531 (62%)
Votes: general - 89,600 (79%)
Martinez:
Expenditures: $179,465 (primary)*
Votes: primary - 22,241 (29%)
* Numbers represent first filing deadline post-primary
30-SECOND TV SPOT
"Respect-Revised"
Jim Matheson for Congress
Producer/Consultant: Struble Oppel Eichenbaum
MATHESON: I was always taught to respect everyone, including an opponent. But this time, Derek Smith has gone too far. These kinds of personal attacks are what's wrong with politics.
ANNCR: We know Jim Matheson. We know his family, and his values. And we all know these negative attacks are wrong. And yet they continue. This year, Utah voters can elect someone with integrity and character. Jim Matheson: a congressman who will make us proud.
Lessons Learned from the Three Incumbents Who Lost Renomination
1 . Incumbent legislators must not be perceived as losing contact with their districts. That is perhaps the most devastating charge a challenger can level at a sitting office-holder, especially if the incumbent has reinforced the charge by repeated examples of being out of touch, either personally or philosophically.
2. As an elected legislator, do not take your support base for granted, especially If your district is dominated by your own party. Incumbents in "safe" party districts can find themselves in jeopardy if they allow themselves to become estranged from the constituencies that have over the years played an important role in their elections. This opens an opportunity for an effective primary challenger to move once-reliable voter blocs away from your column.
3. Incumbent elected officials who switch parties need to be very sensitive to the needs and concerns of local activists in their new party. Many of these grassroots party workers may have previously opposed your candidacy, so switching allegiances may be somewhat difficult for them. It is important that they be contacted one-by-one, on an individual basis, by the elected official himself or herself. Their support should not be assumed, even if you have endorsements from the party's top leadership.
4. In a district dominated by one party, interest groups that are supportive of an incumbent legislator may withdraw their support if they believe the Incumbent does not exert a leadership role on behalf of their Issues - even if the incumbent votes with them most of the time. This would apply, for example, to organized labor In a Democratic district or to business organizations in a Republican district.
5. Challengers who defeat incumbents of their own party for renomination by running intense negative campaigns may find that they win the battle but lose the war. They should be careful that what they do to win the primary doesn't also prevent them from winning the final contest. This particularly applies in competitive districts where the other party's nominee wins without a major intraparty fight. Because bloody primaries can be very harmful in a general election, primary contestants who have survived nasty primary fights need to make sure their general election positioning takes that into account. This may mean that they have to open their general election campaigns on a more positive note.
-Ron Faucheux
[Sidebar]
Derek Smith
Republican for Congress
Derek Smith knows:Nothing burdens our families and businesses like high taxes.
And there's nothing fair or good about a 5.75 million word tax code.
Grucci piece used in the general election.
[Sidebar]
Congressman Mike Forbes stood with Newt Gingrich 1 00% on the Contract with America.
Here's his record and a chance to tell us what you think.
"Reformer"
Felix Grucci for Congress
Producer /Consultant: David Welch
General Election
SEN. MCCAIN: I'm supporting Felix. We need people who are committed to reforming the institutions of government. I'm convinced that Felix's record is that...
ANNCR: Felix Grucci, leader of Fireworks by Grucci and town supervisor, now taking his reform agenda to Congress. To insure access to affordable health care, get people a fair shake from their HMOs and keep Social Security and Medicare working for our seniors.
GRUCCI: As your congressman, you'll always know where I stand.
[Sidebar]
Who stood with Newt Gingrich 100%?
[Author Affiliation]
Mary Clare Jalonick is associate editor of Campaigns & Elections magazine ano managing editor of Campaign Insider. This case study is part of The Campaign Assessment and Candidate Outreach series sponsored by the Center for American Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland, with a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts.
